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CASE NOTES
limited the union entity concept for tort actions to a violation of those
duties growing out of the union-member relationship, leaving open the
question of recognition of union entity for a violation of a duty owed to
the members in common, such as negligent maintenance of a union park-
ing lot.
The California Court in the Marshall case extended the entity concept
to include all union torts. Consequently two states, California and in cer-
tain factual situations Wisconsin, allow recovery in suits by union mem-
bers against the unincorporated union. All the other states, including
Illinois, uphold the concept that voluntary unincorporated associations
may not be sued by their members.
The minority view seems to be the better reasoned holdings. Labor
unions are developing institutions and with their tremendous growth in
importance and power they have come to be more akin to large corpora-
tions than fraternal orders or partnerships. 20 These organizations, no
longer being comparable to voluntary fraternal orders or partnerships,
are sui generis and approximate corporations in their methods of operation
and power.21 Since labor unions have more of the characteristics of cor-
porate entities than of partnerships, it appears far more logical to treat
them as legal entities for purposes of tort liability than to apply rules of
partnerships.
20 Oil Workers International Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 230 P. 2d
71 (1951).
21 Ibid.
OBSCENITY-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF
CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS
Two booksellers were convicted of violating the obscenity statute
of New York State.' A New York detective, representing himself as
a prospective customer, entered a bookstore managed by one of the
defendants. He observed two particular books on display, purchased said
books, and thereupon arrested the defendant for selling pornographic ma-
terial. Later in the same day the detective entered the store of the other
defendant and repeated the procedure, arresting this defendant also. At
the trial, the court applied the Roth test 2 to determine whether or not the
' See NEw YORK, PENAL LAW, S 1141 subd. 1, the relevant part of which provides;
"a person who sells .... or has in his possession with intent to sell .... any obscene ....
book... . is guilty of a misdemeanor."'
2 The test for obscenity was officially laid down to be: "whether to the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the ma-
terial taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 489 (1957).
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material in question was, in fact, obscene and therefore within the purview
of the statute. Although the defendants neither testified nor called any
witnesses on their behalf at the trial, they attempted to establish that the
material was not obscene by cross-examining the arresting officer and
offering other evidence. Upon cross-examination, the detective admitted
that during the year preceeding the defendants' arrest, he had seen copies
of other similar publications in bookstores and on magazine stands in New
York City. In the attempt to link the detective's testimony to his defense,
the defendant offered into evidence a book and several magazines openly
sold in the community similar to the materials in question. The purpose
of such evidence was to show the court that the material in question met
the community standards3 and was therefore not obscene. The evidence
was excluded as being irrelevant to the issue as to whether or not the
specific books sold by the defendants were obscene. The defendants were
found guilty. As grounds for a second appeal, 4 the defendants assigned as
error the trial court's exclusion of the proffered evidence claiming it vio-
lated due process. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling
with respect to the exclusion of such evidence and affirmed the conviction.
People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y. 2d 300, 183 N.E. 2d 661 (1962).
The problem of determining what is and what is not obscene has always
been a perplexing and confusing one. The word "obscene" does not lend
itself to any constant and universal definition," and it is precisely this dif-
ficulty which has necessitated judicial interpretation of this word from
time to time. Under the most recent interpretation handed down in
Rotb v. United States,6 the Supreme Court applied the following test:
"... whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest." Although the test, on its face, appears to be easily
applicable, the instant case points out a practical difficulty in applying
this test, which the courts have only begun to consider. Since the "com-
munity standards" have been made a criterion in judging obscenity, the
problem which has arisen is: does the defendant have a constitutional right
in obscenity prosecutions to introduce into evidence other publications,
magazines, books, etc. and/or expert testimony to show the court what
the contemporary community standards are, and how his material com-
8 Ibid.
4 People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y. 2d 342, 174 N.E. 2d 470 (1961) (first appeal).
5 State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W. 2d 283 (1954); American Civil Liberties
Union v. City of Chicago, 3 111. 2d 334, 121 N.E. 2d 585 (1954); Adams Theatre Corp v.
Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 96 A. 2d 519 (1953); Khan v. Leo Feist Inc., 70 F. Supp. 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1947), affd 165 F. 2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947); Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511
(D.C. Cir. 1945); United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
6354 U.S. 476 (1957). 7 Id. at 489.
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pares with such standards? Since this test was not judicially proclaimed
until 1957, the decisions specifically answering this problem are few, and
of these there is already a split of authority, which will be discussed below.
This specific problem was never encountered prior to the Roth decision.
The reason is apparent from an examination of the earlier interpretations
of obscenity. Probably the first test employed in the courts of this country
was that in U.S. v. Bennett.8 In that case, the defendant was convicted of
depositing an obscene book in the U.S. mails in violation of a federal
statute. The defendant challenged the court's ruling that the book was
obscene and sought a new trial. In denying him a new trial, the judge
declared that the test for judging obscenity was: "whether the tendency
of the matter is to deprave and corrupt the morals of those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall." 9 This test was taken from an earlier English deci-
sion'0 and was subsequently followed in this country for quite a number
of years with only very minor changes, especially in the state courts.,"
By the very language of this definition, what was obscene depended upon
the influence the material had on "those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences" and not upon the impact of the material on the com-
munity as a whole. Since there was no consideration of the community
standards involved, it was obviously irrelevant to allow the defendant to
show what other similar publications and writings were being circulated
in the community. Expert testimony was also considered inadmissible for
generally two reasons: (1) obscenity was considered a matter of judg-
ment within the knowledge and experience of ordinary jurymen and
therefore the testimony of an expert was not needed, 12 and (2) expert
testimony tended to invade the province of the jury by predetermining
the issue of whether or not the material was obscene and therefore, with-
holding such evidence was proper.18 The standard employed only called
for a consideration of the "tendency" of the material in question; there-
fore the "tendency" of other materials, and expert testimony were super-
fluous to this issue. Since such evidence was irrelevant, the state courts
held that its omission or inadmissibility did not violate the defendant's
constitutional right to due process. Therefore, in the judgment of the
8 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, case no. 14571 (1879). 9 Id. at 1102.
10 Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. (1868), 3 Q.B. 360, 371.
11 People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P. 2d 853 (1946); Commonwealth v.
Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d 840 (1945); People v. Grossan, 87 Cal. App. 5, 261
Pac. 531 (1927); U.S. v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (1913); People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408
(1884).
12 People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884).
13 People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P. 2d 853 (1947).
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state courts, a constitutional problem never arose. Despite the fact that
the criterion has changed in the state courts to comply with the Rotb
decision, their position as to the exclusion of such evidence has remained
unchanged in many states, as exemplified by the instant case in New York.
The trend of admitting evidence in obscenity cases has developed dif-
ferently, however, in federal decisions. As early as 1913, the court indi-
cated, in the form of dictum, that the Hicklin test 14 was perhaps too "old-
fashioned" and some consideration should be given to the "compromise
between candor and shame at which the community has arrived here and
now.""I This appears to be the first indication in a court decision that the
community standard ought to be given some weight. Then, in U.S. v.
One Book Entitled Ulysses,16 the court indicated that book reviews and
appraisals of competent critics would be admissible evidence to enlighten
the court on the community standards. This contention was sanctioned in
U.S. v. Levine17 where Justice Learned Hand noted that he would allow
published reviews of qualified critics as evidence, but not as expert testi-
mony. Shortly thereafter, expert testimony received the approval of the
federal courts in Parmelee v. U.S.,"s where it was held that in borderline
cases, expert opinions of psychologists and sociologists would be helpful,
if not necessary. The court's increasing concern over the inclusion of
community standards as an important element in defining obscenity mani-
fested itself in the Roth case.' 9 The problem which has arisen since this
decision is whether the refusal of the court to allow any such evidence
violates the defendant's constitutional right to due process.
There are a few recent decisions which deal directly with the due proc-
ess consideration. Perhaps the most significant of these is Smith v. Cali-
fornia,2° in which the defendant was convicted for having pornographic
books in his bookstore. At the trial, the defendant attempted to introduce
expert testimony to show that the books were not obscene and therefore
not subject to censorship. The trial court refused the evidence. The de-
fendant excepted to this and other alleged errors and appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States. The conviction was reversed by the
majority, although on other grounds. However, in a concurring opinion,
Justice Frankfurter stated, as dictum, that evidence such as expert testi-
mony should be a constitutional requirement and therefore the refusal of
any court to allow such evidence would be a violation of due process. In
14 Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. (1868), 3 Q.B. 360, 371.
15 U.S. v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1913).
"6 72 F. 2d 705 (1934). 1783 F. 2d 156 (1936). Is 113 F. 2d 729 (1940).
'9 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
20 361 U.S. 147 (1959)-see also People v. Smith, 161 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 860, 327 P. 2d
636 (1958).
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a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan expressed the belief that the defend-
ant must be allowed to bring some evidence bearing upon community
standards, though it need not necessarily be expert testimony.
In a recent review article, 2' two authorities on the subject of obscenity
expressed their opinion as follows:
It seems to us that the admission and thoughtful consideration of such evidence
are essential to an intelligent appraisal of material alleged to be obscene, for
without such evidence courts are forced to assume the role of critic and expert
in many fields of human endeavr-a role that few courts, if any, are compe-
tent to play.... We think that the admission of such evidence, when proffered
by either side in an obscenity case, should be made a constitutional require-
ment.
22
The article goes on to indicate, however, that whether or not such evi-
dence attains the level of a constitutional requirement can only be deter-
mined by future decisions. One recent decision, In re Harris,2 8 has taken
this position. In that case, the defendant was convicted of selling obscene
books, violating a California statute. The defendant was not allowed to
introduce expert testimony, or comparable writings adjudged to be not
obscene, or similar writings sold in the community. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of California held that the exclusion of the evidence prof-
fered by the defendant deprived him of due process. The case is signif-
icant because it represents the first decision since the Roth case which
declares that the exclusion of evidence bearing upon community stand-
ards is violative of due process.
The importance of the Finkelstein case becomes apparent because of
the majority's refusal to accept the California Supreme Court's position
that the inclusion of such evidence in obscenity cases is a constitutional
requirement. The majority opinion simply rejected such evidence as be-
ing irrelevant to the issue as to whether or not the material in question is
obscene. One of the concurring opinions did, however, attempt to give a
perspective to the use of evidence on community standards by stating
that such evidence would be admissible but only in borderline cases. In
Judge Voorhis' concurring opinion, the necessity for such evidence is
obviated by relying upon judicial notice of the community standards.
Both of the concurring opinions attempt to justify the court's refusal of
the defendant's proffered evidence. In so doing, they affirm and approve
of the court's earlier decisions.24 This writer feels that neither of the con-
21 Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5 (1960-61).
22 id. at 98, 99.
2356 Cal. 2d 879, 16 Cal. Rprr. 889, 366 P. 2d 305 (1961).
24 People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884).
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curring opinions adequately resolves the dilemma because: (1) it is not
always possible to determine which are borderline cases, and (2) it would
appear to be rather difficult to judicially notice the standards of a large
community like New York or Chicago. There was, however, a strong dis-
senting opinion which basically followed the California court's position,25
citing the opinions of Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan in Smith v.
California20 as authority. This dissent indicated a dissatisfaction with the
reasoning of the majority and a firm conviction that excluding the de-
fendant's evidence in obscenity cases does violate due process.
As was pointed out previously, certain members of the Supreme Court
of the United States and experts in the field of obscenity appear to be
leaning more and more toward the position that the admissibility of com-
parable writings and/or expert testimony as evidence of the community
standards is a constitutional guarantee. Indeed this position appears to be
the more sensible one. The fact is, there is such a plethora of ideas and
philosophies which compose present-day societies, that to extract a par-
ticular community standard from this mass is an extremely difficult task
for any judge or jury to perform without the help of any guide lines. In
light of the increasing strength gathering behind this position, and the
fact that the New York court has a strong dissent, it would appear as
though New York will ultimately have to change its position and admit
such evidence in obscenity cases. In the meantime, the Finkelstein case
represents the view opposed to the California position, and accounts for
the split of authority on this problem to date.
25 In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 366 P. 2d 305 (1961).
26 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
PARENT AND CHILD-STATE'S RIGHT TO TAKE CUSTODY
OF A CHILD IN NEED OF MEDICAL CARE
John Perricone, a blue baby, was brought to the Bedford S. Pollack
Hospital by his parents. When the infant was admitted, Mrs. Perricone
consented to the performance of any surgical operations as the physicians
of the hospital thought necessary for the welfare of the boy. However,
she instructed that it be noted on the progress record "the parents are
Jehovah Witnesses-request no usage of blood transfusions." Blood trans-
fusions became necessary and they were refused by John's parents.
Thomas J. Finn, superintendent of the hospital, brought an action in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Hudson County, Jersey City,
New Jersey, to have a special guardian appointed for the purpose of ad-
ministering the necessary transfusions. A special guardian was appointed
